Churchill's Secret War Read online

  Linlithgow protested that India’s grain reserves were so low as to threaten disaster in the near future. “Rice crisis [inevitable] later in the year and additional shipments of wheat will be essential to help to meet this,” he wrote to Amery on February 21, 1943. “India’s own need is so acute that I must press for retention of all tonnage allocated to us already and repeat that further substantial allocations will be necessary later on.” But on March 2—after hearing a member of the viceroy’s council warn of famine—the shipping committee asserted that “no further diversions of ships from the United Kingdom import programme could be contemplated at present.” 46

  THE INDIAN OCEAN shipping cut saved the United Kingdom from impending calamity, at least as Donald MacDougall of the S branch told the story. The “imports—after falling to a terrifyingly low level for about four months—started arriving in increasing quantities just in time; our stocks—after plummeting in an equally alarming way— levelled off just above the minimum safety level before starting to recover slowly,” he wrote in his memoir. MacDougall was referring to civilian stocks having reached their lowest point in March 1943—when they were still 3.1 million tons above the level (of 11.5 million tons) considered essential by the shipping committee, and 4.8 million tons above the level (of 9.8 million tons) considered essential by the Ministry of Production. And as it happens, even these so-called safety levels of stocks were inflated. “It is clear in retrospect that minimum food requirements were considerably, and raw materials requirements wildly, overstated,” historian W. K. Hancock and economist M. M. Gowing would comment in their official history of the British war economy. The shipping transferred from the Indian Ocean would add 2 million tons of supplies by the end of the summer. That is, the shipping cut that contributed to the outbreak of famine in Bengal merely added to the margin by which stocks were in excess in Britain.47

  Stocks had originally been viewed by the Ministry of Food as a way to tide over the early difficulties of the war, until the dividends were apparent from the Grow More Food program, which expanded the area under cultivation in the British Isles. But as the war wore on, the purpose of the stocks, and the stipulated size, had altered. Cherwell, for instance, saw these food reserves, along with stocks of raw materials needed by factories, not so much as insurance against hard times but as savings that would enable full use to be made of strategic opportunities. “[W]e should strive to build up our stocks so as to be in a position to divert large masses of shipping for military purposes if the occasion arose,” he wrote in a memo. In his view—which prevailed—stocks should be maintained at levels well above those stipulated by the ministries, so that the War Cabinet could retain “flexibility for meeting emergency needs in a period of large scale military operations.”48

  In June 1942, for instance, the shipping committee had formulated a plan to run down existing reserves. It “thought that, between January 1942 and June 1943, stocks could be reduced by six million tons before they reached the level estimated for indispensable working stocks,” wrote Hancock and Gowing. By the summer of 1943 the United States would be producing an abundance of ships, supplies could be swiftly ferried across the Atlantic Ocean, and stocks should no longer be so necessary. But the War Cabinet worried that the Americans might not provide the necessary shipping. If so, food reserves might never be rebuilt to former levels, and “the Government would have no elbow room for strategic operations to take advantage of any sudden weakening of the enemy.” The prime minister inveighed against “tightening the belt,” while the Prof demanded at least 27 million tons of imports in 1943—more than ever before.49

  Another reason for maintaining large stocks, and the corresponding claim on shipping, was the prime minister’s distaste for austerity. In the summer of 1940, for instance, the Ministry of Food had estimated that it needed 15 million tons of imported food and animal feed each year, but at the urging of Churchill and Cherwell it had asked for almost 19 million tons. British rations would come to include red meats, butter and other fats, cheese, tea, sugar, jam, and other preserves. Prices were controlled for bread, milk, eggs, poultry, rabbits, frozen cod, canned salmon, herring, canned pork and beans, spreads made of fish and meat, preserved vegetables, potatoes, onions, rice, lentils, tapioca, sago, biscuits, macaroni and other noodles, canned soups, pickles, sauces, relishes, coffee, cocoa, honey, custard powder, jelly, dried fruit, nuts, oranges, and lemons. Rations and price controls required that stocks of at least the nonperishable commodities be maintained. Despite all this effort and expense, however, Americans had access to more meat, eggs, and fresh fruit than did Britons, a disparity that irked the prime minister.50

  Sensitivity to the public’s tastes consumed additional tonnage on Allied vessels. Nutritionists argued, for instance, that the fraction of wheat grain used for bread flour, called the extraction rate, should be increased so as to enhance the intake of iron and vitamins. Raising the extraction rate would also cut wheat imports and thereby save shipping. But Britons preferred soft white bread, baked out of no more than 80 percent of the flour that whole wheat could yield, so it was not until the spring of 1942 that the extraction rate was increased to 85 percent. The Ministry of Food banned a further increase to 87 percent. That economy would save shipping space and thereby “weaken our bargaining power in that we should immediately be called upon to surrender an equivalent amount of shipping,” one official argued. American officials at the Combined Food Board, an agency based in Washington, D.C., that coordinated the Allies’ distribution of food, had grown suspicious of British import requirements—which meant that every ton of shipping had to be fought for, sometimes for its own sake.51

  The Ministry of Food also resisted the rationing of bread, which it regarded as “the last resort of a starving nation.” The prime minister himself had spoken for such rations in July 1942: he fretted that people might feed chickens with the cheap and plentiful bread. Rationing would reduce such wastage and save a large quantity of shipping. Lord Woolton, a businessman whom Churchill had appointed the minister of food, responded at a War Cabinet meeting that he could save 800,000 tons of shipping by other means if he chose to, and he would prefer that to rationing bread. (Bread rations were introduced only after the war.)52

  Diluting the wheat flour used for baking bread with flour from home-grown barley and potatoes would also save shipping and improve nutrition. But barley was needed for beer, which was necessary for morale, and officials “unanimously recoiled” at the prospect of pubs closing for two days a week. Instead, brewers were persuaded to supplement their barley with oats. These deliberations and negotiations took time, so it was not until January 1943 that the order went out to replace 5 percent of the wheat flour used for bread-making with flour made out of potatoes, oats, barley, and rye. The 5 percent was subsequently increased to 10. It saved 284,000 tons of shipping over nine months—although most of the saving came after the summer, when ships became more available again. The sole sacrifice that ordinary Britons were asked to make in response to the shipping crisis of 1943 was to eat multigrain bread.53

  Historian Kevin Smith maintains that the War Cabinet’s panic over food and other reserves was nevertheless understandable, in light of the heavy and ongoing losses of Allied merchant vessels to German U-boats. In January 1943, no one could have foreseen that three months later the battle against the submarines would be won, and ships would thereafter ply in relative safety across the Atlantic. Be that as it may, the remarkable rate at which the United States was producing ships had been expected to render the shipping losses to U-boats irrelevant by the summer, and by that count alone stocks were ample—more than 4 million tons higher, at the end of 1942, than the quantity of food and raw materials the British economy would consume during the next half-year.54

  In retrospect, it is clear that the threat to British rations posed by the shipping crisis was exaggerated. Take, for instance, the discrepancy between the stock estimates that the S branch provided to the War Cabinet and the figures
that the War Cabinet provided to the U.S. government. On January 8, 1943, Cherwell stated in a draft paper that domestic reserves “are now only 3 million tons above the minimum working level absolutely required, and would continue for several months to dwindle by ¾ million tons a month unless remedial steps were taken.” On March 9, in a draft paper prepared for use by the foreign secretary in his dealings with American authorities, Cherwell again asserted, “by April it seems likely that we shall be down to about ¾ million tons above the minimum safety level.” This estimate is consistent with the previous one if the gains from the cut to Indian Ocean shipping are ignored. But the final version of this paper stated: “by April it seems likely that stocks will be nearly 1 million tons below the minimum safety level.” This was an extraordinary claim, given that in March stocks were 2 million tons above the minimum (of about 12.5 million tons) implicit in the S branch calculations of January. The War Cabinet went on to warn of “living from hand to mouth. Any further drop and the wheels would cease to turn and rations would be jeopardised.”55

  If the food reserve situation was not as critical as claimed, what contingency actually motivated the Indian Ocean shipping cut? In internal documents, the Statistics Division and the Ministry of War Transport cited the real reason as operational flexibility. As Smith explains, an atmosphere of distrust between British and American shipping authorities had made the War Cabinet uncertain of whether the president would keep his promise of extra ships for the United Kingdom import program. In addition, much acrimony prevailed around which of the desired military operations would actually take place. In such circumstances, it made sense for Churchill and Cherwell to hold on to as much shipping and stocks as they could, so that the War Cabinet could pursue military objectives for which the Americans might decline support.56

  Indeed, when in March 1943 General Charles P. Gross, who determined shipping allocations for the United States armed forces, learned of the president’s promise of 7 million tons for the British civilian import program, he expressed himself in such forceful terms that his remarks were left off the record. Such a large call on shipping threatened the entire strategic program agreed upon at Casablanca. Gross alleged that the United Kingdom could get by on 16 million tons of imports for 1943 instead of the 27 million tons that it demanded as the “first charge” on Allied shipping. Furious about what it regarded as British deviousness in having directly approached the president, the U. S. military resisted the handover of ships.57

  THE NOTES ON War Cabinet meetings that were released in 2006 point also to an economic factor as having bolstered the need to retain ample stocks: the extent to which the United Kingdom’s indebtedness threatened its postwar well-being. After the war, Europe would need large infusions of food, world prices would be high, and for the United Kingdom to be importing food at that time would prove costly. Rather than let domestic food stocks run down as the war turned in the Allies’ favor, in July 1942 Churchill had resolved to build them up by accepting Cherwell’s formula of requiring 27 million tons of civilian imports in 1943. Whatever reserves happened to be left at the end of the war would help feed the United Kingdom.58

  Surplus stocks would also be worth a lot on the world market. On January 5, 1943, the War Cabinet discussed an American plan to create stockpiles for feeding liberated Europe. Gathering these supplies without provoking a price rise would require the United States to extend rationing, and officials had asked for a British gesture to help “[put] this across to their people.” An S branch memo composed the day before the meeting noted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had cautioned against making promises to the United States “about the disposal of any stock-piles of commodities we may hold at the end of the war, as these will be our only liquid assets.”59

  At the meeting, Lord Woolton said that the United Kingdom might have to continue rationing after the war, but Americans would still be enjoying more ample portions. “Why shd we bind ourselves to rationing more severe than U.S. impose upon themselves?” Churchill retorted. (The transcripts are abbreviated.) “We have done our share already.” Nor was it wise to promise contributions to Europe: “Do we want to pledge ourselves in advance to give away our only liquid assets?”

  “Don’t want to promise free gifts. Many countries cd. pay,” countered an official.

  “We can bld. up stocks of some commodities here and in Empire. We can promise contributions from those stocks,” added the minister of production.60

  On that very day, the prime minister instituted the shipping cut in the Indian Ocean. Unless the Americans provided a great deal of extra shipping, the goal of 27 million tons of imports could not be met, the Prof warned on January 8: “restriction of shipping to the Eastern theatres will therefore have to be maintained to a very considerable extent throughout the year.” That would be well after the stock stringency anticipated for the spring had passed. So it was concern about the United Kingdom’s postwar finances, not just about wartime food supply or operational flexibility, that motivated the determination to build domestic stocks by cutting Indian Ocean shipping. In making their decision, the Prof and the prime minister exported as much as possible of Britain’s future economic risk to the colonies—where it precipitated immediate catastrophe.61

  DURING THE FIRST half of 1943 the United Kingdom would receive two-thirds of the goods that were loaded at North Atlantic ports. British stocks of food and raw materials, after dipping to a low of 14.6 million tons in March, increased steadily to reach an all-time high of 18.5 million tons in December. Such levels of reserves had to be repeatedly justified to American officials who questioned British appetites. The explanations involved elasticity in the definition of a key quantity: the working stock. As R. J. Hammond described in the official history of Britain’s wartime food supply, the most essential stocks were of the “working” or “distributional” type, needed to maintain the smooth flow of commodities. For instance, a dockside warehouse needed to be sufficiently empty that it could absorb goods whenever a ship arrived to unload, but also full enough that it could disgorge goods to trucks anytime they showed up to load. Working stocks were the sum total of such reserves. The exigencies of war required, in addition, “contingency” stocks to allow for sudden difficulties.62

  In practice, the Ministry of Food lumped working stocks together with contingency stocks to define a quantity that it insisted was an absolute minimum. This figure was actually much higher than necessary. Hammond noted, for instance, that although in the first months of war the stocks of wheat available to mills had fallen to 260,000 tons, the vast majority of mills had kept on going. But in 1943 the ministry insisted that it needed 850,000 tons of working stocks alone. And although 1942 saw a record harvest of wheat (2.5 million tons) and 1943 topped even that, the ministry ignored the home crop in its calculations—almost doubling its secret margin of safety. Nor did estimates of bread consumption allow for the gigantic output of potatoes (10.1 million tons in 1942), large quantities of which would be fed to pigs. The Ministry of Production similarly inflated the stock requirements of industrial raw materials and defined a “distributional minimum” that it put forth as irreducible. The Prof referred to an analogous, but even higher, quantity as the “minimum safety level” or “danger level”—at once rendering it sacrosanct. In truth, had stocks fallen below even “the real minimum working level, there still remained some additional economies the Government could impose,” noted Hancock and Gowing.63

  Unfortunately, “every ton of food unnecessarily earmarked for [working stocks] was condemned to uselessness only less surely than if it had been destroyed,” commented Hammond. Millions of tons of supplies had to be held in storage in the British Isles and could not be consumed even during the shipping crisis of early 1943. In December 1942, for instance, 1.8 million tons of wheat grain and flour were at hand, enough for more than six months’ consumption, with record harvests of wheat expected for, and reaped in, the summer of 1943. Overall, the stocks of imported food and raw materials
held at the end of 1942 were around 4.5 million tons higher than those consumed during the next six months—after which the shipping stringency was over.64

  On March 9, 1943, Leathers reminded the shipping committee that the second half of 1943 should see a “large increase” in available shipping because of the phenomenal rate at which Americans were producing ships. The president should be persuaded to transfer some vessels to British control, Cherwell suggested: “Only if we can build up our stocks to something like the 1942 level shall we be in a position to seize our opportunities in the summer and autumn.” Losses of vessels to submarines fell steeply that spring, because bombers recently assigned to the convoys of merchant ships were picking off the enemy’s U-boats in unprecedented numbers. So Roosevelt reiterated his promise of 7 million tons. Even if all this shipping should come in, the Prof argued in April, “it would still leave us short, unless shipments to the Indian Ocean remained at their present low level.”65

  As it happened, in April 1943 a bumper wheat crop was being harvested in the northwest of India, so the Government of India agreed to do without further shipments. But it then proceeded to buy such vast quantities of grain—the armed forces alone would consume 650,000 tons that year—that by May prices had resumed their upward trend.66

  In the circumstances, it was inevitable that London would later accuse New Delhi of having sent conflicting messages about its need. The Ministry of War Transport pointed out that the estimated cereal shortage had fallen from 2.5 million tons before the wheat harvest to 1.3 million tons after it, “which suggests that these paper calculations are rather an unreliable basis” for the Government of India’s requests for substantial help. Defending the government against the charge of unreliability, Robert Hutchings of India’s food department stated to the famine commission that he and others had “always tried to recognize the appalling strain on His Majesty’s Government and the United Nations over shipping. We never felt justified in asking for a ton more than we really believed to be necessary. Sometimes, when our crop prospects seemed good, we have stated: ‘All right, we could do with a little less or you could slow up imports; let us have them later in the year.’ . . . [W]e never at any stage adopted what is sometimes described as bazaar tactics—that is, asking for a lot in the hope that we will get something less.”67